The Economics of Asymmetric Information

Author: Brian Hillier

Publisher: Macmillan International Higher Education

ISBN: 1349254851

Category: Economics

Page: 208

View: 9167

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This book presents recent developments in the economics of asymmetric information. The problems of selection and moral hazard, with hidden actions or hidden information, are introduced by examining how they affect the market for investment finance. The ideas are then used to analyse the market for insurance, signalling and screening models of education, efficiency wages, industrial regulation, public procurement and auctions. Coverage is thorough while avoiding excessive mathematical detail. Diagrams and verbal reasoning make the ideas accessible to intermediate level undergraduate students and beyond.

Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets

Introduction and Applications

Author: Ricardo N. Bebczuk

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

ISBN: 9780521797320

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 159

View: 1718

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Examination of the features and implications of asymmetric information in financial markets.

Quality Uncertainty and Perception

Information Asymmetry and Management of Quality Uncertainty and Quality Perception

Author: Lalit Wankhade,Balaji Dabade

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

ISBN: 9783790821956

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 115

View: 7738

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It has been observed that the studies of quality are pursued in various disciplines like economics, quality management, and marketing science, and are seen isolated. The treatments imparted to these studies are also different and has the backdrop of discipline in which the work has been pursued. The nature of isolation is equally seen when quality uncertainty and perceived quality were pursued separately without showing any inkling that these can be complimentary. Economist and Nobel Laureate, Akerlof (1970), wrote a seminal piece “The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and market mechanism”, where he described quality uncertainty due to information asymmetry. It refers to the fact that a party in a transaction may have more information than the other. This is information asymmetry. If the seller has more information than the buyer about the product quality, he/she may sell it, as if it is a high-quality product. In reality, it could be a low-quality product. The buyer does not have the information regarding the quality of the offered product. The market condition that led to this transaction is quality uncertainty due to information asymmetry.

Economics of Asymmetric Information

Author: Dilip M. Nachane,Biswajit Chatterjee

Publisher: Deep and Deep Publications

ISBN: 9788176298261

Category: Information theory in economics

Page: 234

View: 9182

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Contributed papers presented at the one of the technical sessions of Indian Economic Association's 85th conference held at the Kerala University in 2002.

An Introduction to the Economics of Information

Incentives and Contracts

Author: Inés Macho-Stadler,J. David Pérez-Castrillo

Publisher: Oxford University Press on Demand

ISBN: 9780199243259

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 287

View: 1548

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In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The book is written for a one-semester course for advanced undergraduates taking specialized course options, and for first-year postgraduate students of economics or business. After an introduction to the subject and the presentation of a benchmark model in which both parties share the same information throughout the relationship, chapters are devoted to the three main asymmetric information topics of Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Signalling. The wide range of economic situations where the conclusions are applied includes such areas as finance, regulation, insurance, labour economics, health economics, and even politics. Each chapter presents the basic theory before moving on to applications and advanced topics. The problems are presented in the same framework throughout to allow easy comparison of the different results. This new edition incorporates extended exercises to test the student's understanding of the material, and to develop the tools and skills provided by the main text to solve other, original problems.

The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information

Author: Ulrich Schwalbe

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

ISBN: 3642584772

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 147

View: 8932

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and should therefore constitute a part of every area of economic 3 theory. The spectrum covered by information economics today ranges from Stigler's search theory4 to industrial economics, including oligopoly theory, innovation, as well as research and develop 5 ment. However, the area information economics is most closely connected with is the theory of optimal contracts, mainly ana 6 lyzed in principal-agent models. Contract theory deals primar ily with the question of how optimal arrangements (contracts) for the purchase and sale of commodities and services between two or more agents should be structured. In these models, it is often assumed that the parties to the contract are informed differently or asymmetrically about relevant variables (e. g. the health of one party in the case of insurance contracts, or the effort in relation to employment contracts). As a result of this asymmetric in formation, phenomena such as moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling, and screening may arise. Frequently, results from con tract theory are referred to when making statements about the effects of asymmetric information on an economy. Models of this kind are often used to explain phenomena such as fixed wages or unemployment, among others. 7 However, such conclusions must be treated with caution for two reasons. In the first place, in these models, a contract (explicit or implicit) is determined by the solution of an optimization prob lem.

Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information

Bubbles, Crashes, Technical Analysis, and Herding

Author: Markus K. Brunnermeier

Publisher: OUP Oxford

ISBN: 0191606928

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 262

View: 6499

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Asset prices are driven by public news and information that is often dispersed among many market participants. These agents try to infer each other's information by analyzing price processes. In the past two decades, theoretical research in financial economics has significantly advanced our understanding of the informational aspects of price processes. This book provides a detailed and up-to-date survey of this important body of literature. The book begins by demonstrating how to model asymmetric information and higher-order knowledge. It then contrasts competitive and strategic equilibrium concepts under asymmetric information. It also illustrates the dependence of information efficiency and allocative efficiency on the security structure and the linkage between both efficiency concepts. No-Trade theorems and market breakdowns due to asymmetric information are then explained, and the existence of bubbles under symmetric and asymmetric information is investigated. The remainder of the survey is devoted to contrasting different market microstructure models that demonstrate how asymmetric information affects asset prices and traders' information , which provide a theoretical explanation for technical analysis and illustrate why some investors "chase the trend." The reader is then introduced to herding models and informational cascades, which can arise in a setting where agents' decision-making is sequential. The insights derived from herding models are used to provide rational explanations for stock market crashes. Models in which all traders are induced to search for the same piece of information are then presented to provide a deeper insight into Keynes' comparison of the stock market with a beauty contest. The book concludes with a brief summary of bank runs and their connection to financial crises.

Phishing for Fools

Manipulation und Täuschung in der freien Marktwirtschaft

Author: George A. Akerlof,Robert J. Shiller

Publisher: Ullstein eBooks

ISBN: 3843713650

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 416

View: 9106

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Seit Adam Smith ist eine der zentralen Thesen der Wirtschaftswissenschaften, dass freie Märkte und freier Wettbewerb die besten Voraussetzungen für allgemeinen Wohlstand sind. Die Wirtschaftsnobelpreisträger George Akerlof und Robert Shiller argumentieren dagegen, dass Märkte nicht von sich aus gutartig sind und sich auch nicht immer die besten Produkte durchsetzen. Die Autoren behandeln in diesem Buch erstmals die zentrale Rolle von Manipulation und Täuschung in der Wirtschaft. Anhand von zahlreichen Fallbeispielen zeigen sie, wie wir verleitet werden, mehr Geld auszugeben, als wir haben; wie wir von Werbung stärker beeinflusst werden, als wir glauben; warum wir oft zu viel bezahlen und wie massiv die Politik durch Wirtschaft beeinflusst wird. Was ist besonders? Zwei Wirtschaftsnobelpreisträger widerlegen die These der selbstregulierenden Märkte. Wer liest? • Alle, die sich für Verhaltensökonomie, freie Marktwirtschaft oder Wirtschaftstheorie interessieren

Equilibrium in Insurance Markets With Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection

Author: Jonathan A. K. Cave

Publisher: N.A

ISBN: 9780833005540

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 71

View: 3210

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This report examines possible outcomes of greater competition in insurance markets. The report describes the nature of insurance offerings in equilibrium if firms offer multiple policies; but it replaces the conventional assumption that each policy must earn nonnegative profits with the more realistic requirement that the portfolio of policies offered by the firm earn nonnegative profits in the aggregate. Theorems regarding the existence, optimality, and uniqueness of the subsidy equilibrium are presented, together with a simple characterization of the subsidy equilibrium and a comparison with existing equilibrium notions. Because the subsidy patterns, from low to high, that emerge under this formulation appear to characterize multiple-option insurance plans such as the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan, this model may be more useful than conventional methods in the analysis of such plans.

Supply Chain Coordination in Case of Asymmetric Information

Information Sharing and Contracting in a Just-in-Time environment.

Author: Guido Vogt

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

ISBN: 9783642201325

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 181

View: 1053

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Information sharing is frequently promoted as a mean to improve the supply chain performance. This work shows the results of behavioral experiments, in which the participants share private information in order to influence the contract terms in a Just-in-Time environment. It is shown that the impact of information sharing is ambiguous, and dependent on several factors, such as contract flexibility and complexity or the interacting behavioral types. The experimental results form the basis for a behavioral principal-agent model that gives valuable insights on how the interaction of trust, trustworthiness and the information sharing strategy impacts the supply chain performance.

Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment

Author: R. Glenn Hubbard

Publisher: University of Chicago Press

ISBN: 0226355942

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 352

View: 4314

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In this volume, specialists from traditionally separate areas in economics and finance investigate issues at the conjunction of their fields. They argue that financial decisions of the firm can affect real economic activity—and this is true for enough firms and consumers to have significant aggregate economic effects. They demonstrate that important differences—asymmetries—in access to information between "borrowers" and "lenders" ("insiders" and "outsiders") in financial transactions affect investment decisions of firms and the organization of financial markets. The original research emphasizes the role of information problems in explaining empirically important links between internal finance and investment, as well as their role in accounting for observed variations in mechanisms for corporate control.

Contributions to Insurance Economics

Author: Georges Dionne

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

ISBN: 9780792391753

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 524

View: 822

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For a number of years, I have been teaching and doing research in the economics of uncertainty, information, and insurance. Although it is now possible to find textbooks and books of essays on uncertainty and in formation in economics and finance for graduate students and researchers, there is no equivalent material that covers advanced research in insurance. The purpose of this book is to fill this gap in literature. It provides original surveys and essays in the field of insurance economics. The contributions offer basic reference, new material, and teaching supple ments to graduate students and researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. It represents a complement to the book of readings entitled Foundations of Insurance Economics - Readings in Economics and Finance, recently published by the S.S. Huebner Foundation of Insurance Education. In that book, the editors (G. Dionne and S. Harrington) disseminate key papers in the literature and publish an original survey of major contributions in the field.

Information Economics

Author: Urs Birchler,Monika Bütler

Publisher: Routledge

ISBN: 1134190581

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 488

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This new text book by Urs Birchler and Monika Butler is an introduction to the study of how information affects economic relations. The authors provide a narrative treatment of the more formal concepts of Information Economics, using easy to understand and lively illustrations from film and literature and nutshell examples. The book first covers the economics of information in a 'man versus nature' context, explaining basic concepts like rational updating or the value of information. Then in a 'man versus man' setting, Birchler and Butler describe strategic issues in the use of information: the make-buy-or-copy decision, the working and failure of markets and the important role of outguessing each other in a macroeconomic context. It closes with a 'man versus himself' perspective, focusing on information management within the individual. This book also comes with a supporting website (www.alicebob.info), maintained by the authors.

Versicherungsökonomie

Author: Peter Zweifel,Roland Eisen

Publisher: Springer-Verlag

ISBN: 3662107848

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 486

View: 4368

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Das Buch macht den Leser mit den zentralen Fragestellungen und dem analytischen Werkzeug der Versicherungsökonomik vertraut. Es führt Beiträge zur Nachfrage nach Versicherung, zum Angebot an Versicherung und der Versicherungsregulierung sowie zur Sozialversicherung in einer vereinheitlichten Darstellung zusammen, die bisher nur verstreut in Zeitschriften und Sammelbänden verfügbar waren. Es werden empirisch überprüfbare Voraussagen der Theorie abgeleitet und den Ergebnissen internationaler empirischer Forschung gegenübergestellt. Ausformulierte Folgerungen fassen den Stoff zusammen und erleichtern die Kontrolle des Wissensstands.

Handbook of the Economics of Risk and Uncertainty

Author: Mark Machina,W. Kip Viscusi

Publisher: Newnes

ISBN: 0444536868

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 896

View: 7284

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The need to understand the theories and applications of economic and finance risk has been clear to everyone since the financial crisis, and this collection of original essays proffers broad, high-level explanations of risk and uncertainty. The economics of risk and uncertainty is unlike most branches of economics in spanning from the individual decision-maker to the market (and indeed, social decisions), and ranging from purely theoretical analysis through individual experimentation, empirical analysis, and applied and policy decisions. It also has close and sometimes conflicting relationships with theoretical and applied statistics, and psychology. The aim of this volume is to provide an overview of diverse aspects of this field, ranging from classical and foundational work through current developments. Presents coherent summaries of risk and uncertainty that inform major areas in economics and finance Divides coverage between theoretical, empirical, and experimental findings Makes the economics of risk and uncertainty accessible to scholars in fields outside economics

Castles, Battles, and Bombs

How Economics Explains Military History

Author: Jurgen Brauer,Hubert van Tuyll

Publisher: University of Chicago Press

ISBN: 9780226071657

Category: History

Page: 424

View: 4961

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Castles, Battles, and Bombs reconsiders key episodes of military history from the point of view of economics—with dramatically insightful results. For example, when looked at as a question of sheer cost, the building of castles in the High Middle Ages seems almost inevitable: though stunningly expensive, a strong castle was far cheaper to maintain than a standing army. The authors also reexamine the strategic bombing of Germany in World War II and provide new insights into France’s decision to develop nuclear weapons. Drawing on these examples and more, Brauer and Van Tuyll suggest lessons for today’s military, from counterterrorist strategy and military manpower planning to the use of private military companies in Afghanistan and Iraq. "In bringing economics into assessments of military history, [the authors] also bring illumination. . . . [The authors] turn their interdisciplinary lens on the mercenary arrangements of Renaissance Italy; the wars of Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon; Grant's campaigns in the Civil War; and the strategic bombings of World War II. The results are invariably stimulating."—Martin Walker, Wilson Quarterly "This study is serious, creative, important. As an economist I am happy to see economics so professionally applied to illuminate major decisions in the history of warfare."—Thomas C. Schelling, Winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics

Handbook of the Economics of Finance

Corporate Finance

Author: George M. Constantinides,M. Harris,Rene M. Stulz

Publisher: Elsevier

ISBN: 9780080495071

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 654

View: 5537

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Volume 1A covers corporate finance: how businesses allocate capital - the capital budgeting decision - and how they obtain capital - the financing decision. Though managers play no independent role in the work of Miller and Modigliani, major contributions in finance since then have shown that managers maximize their own objectives. To understand the firm's decisions, it is therefore necessary to understand the forces that lead managers to maximize the wealth of shareholders.